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FAMILY HISTORY: INSIDE AND OUT
Kerry Abrams*
INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY

By Joanna L. Grossman and Lawrence M. Friedman.
Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 2011. Pp. 331.
$35.
AMERICA.

INTRODUCTION

The twenty-first century has seen the dawn of a new era of the family, an
era that has its roots in the twentieth. Many of the social and scientific phenomena of our time-same-sex couples, in vitro fertilization, single-parent
families, international adoption-have inspired changes in the law. Legal
change has encompassed both constitutional doctrine and statutory innovations, from landmark Supreme Court decisions articulating a right to
procreate (or not), a liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of one's
children, and even a right to marry, to state no-fault divorce statutes that
have fundamentally changed the way married couples dissolve their legal
relationships. But thus far, no legal scholar has attempted to write a comprehensive history of twentieth-century family law. To be sure, many excellent
books have been written on particular aspects of the twentieth-century story' Inside the Castle: Law and the Family in 20th Century America, by
Joanna Grossman 2 and Lawrence Friedman,' however, is the first book to
my knowledge that attempts to provide a comprehensive social history of
twentieth-century family law in the United States.
The goal that Inside the Castle articulates is "to look inside the home,
inside the castle; to map a century's worth of dynamic change" (p. 22). The
central claim of the book is that the rapid social change that occurred during
the twentieth century forced the law to adapt in correspondingly sweeping
ways. Readers who are familiar with Professor Friedman's voluminous other books and articles on legal history will recognize his "law as mirror of
society" thesis here, and readers of Professor Grossman's numerous law
review articles and Justia commentaries will recognize her careful attention
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1. See, e.g., NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION (2000); MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAw (1989); HENDRIK
HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA

(2000);

HENDRIK HARTOG, SOMEDAY ALL THIS WILL

BE YOURS: A HISTORY OF INHERITANCE AND OLD AGE (2012); ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN
PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-

CENTURY AMERICA (2001).

2.
3.

Professor of Law, Hofstra University, Maurice A. Deane School of Law.
Marion Rice Kirkwood Professor of Law, Stanford Law School.
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to the effects of contemporary social phenomena on the law.4 "Family law
follows family life," Professors Grossman and Friedman state (p. 2).
That is, what happens to families, in this society, determines what happens
to the law of the family. Law is not autonomous; it does not evolve according to some mysterious inner program; it grows and decays and shifts and

fidgets in line with what is happening in the larger society. (p. 2)
Professors Grossman and Friedman identify a plethora of social changes
that transformed American family law. These include technological changes,
such as contraception, fast and efficient transportation, and medical advances leading to longer life spans; social changes, such as "dramatic changes in
relations between men and women" and "the particular mass culture of the
late twentieth century"; and economic changes, including a booming industrial and postindustrial economy and vastly increased individual wealth (pp.
7-8). Together, these new changes helped to produce a new kind of person-the autonomous individual. Where the nineteenth-century married
couple stayed together "until death do us part," the twentieth-century couple-at least by century's end-stayed together until the marriage "no
longer contributed to personal growth and fulfillment, for either partner" (p.
12). Whereas nineteenth-century men and women were expected to marry to
have "legitimate, approved-of sex," twentieth-century unmarried couples
began cohabiting in such great numbers that by the late twentieth century,
"it had pretty much become normal" (p. 10). And it was not only married
couples who became more autonomous; extended families broke apart, the
birth rate receded, and adult children were placed in the difficult position of
being financially responsible for aging parents living longer postretirement
lives.'
Inside the Castle ties the major legal changes in family regulation to
these changed social conditions. According to its story, the desire for companionate marriage led to no-fault divorce (pp. 13-16); the weakening of
sexual mores led to the abolition of laws criminalizing nonmarital sexual
activity (pp. 9-13); the aging of the population led to social programs such
as Medicare and Social Security, which serve as "a lifeline for seniors" but
are also highly beneficial to their adult children, relieving them of much of
the "financial burden of parent-care" (pp. 16-17). Even changes in adoption
law can be traced to these fundamental social changes. When "bastards"
became the more benignly termed "nonmarital children," adoption no longer
carried a stigma requiring secrecy, and when family formation became a
matter of self-fulfillment rather than a duty, choosing to become a parent
through adoption or alternative reproductive technologies became a laudable
goal worthy of facilitation through law (pp. 20-21).
4.

For examples of the authors' previous work, see

M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME
M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW (3d ed. 2005); Joanna L. Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of
Equal Citizenship, 98 GEo. L.J. 567 (2010); and Joanna L. Grossman, Resurrecting Comity:
Revisiting the Problem of Non-Uniform MarriageLaws, 84 OR. L. REV. 433 (2005).
AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY

5.

See pp. 16-17.

(1993);
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If all of this sounds as if it applies primarily to the middle class-or perhaps even the upper middle class-that's because it does. Professors
Grossman and Friedman are refreshingly up-front about the limitations of
their project. They admit, near the very beginning of the book, that "it would
be more accurate to say that this is a book about middle-class family law"
(p. 2). They expressly distinguish "another, vast field, which deals with poor
families" (p. 2), the law commonly referred to as "welfare law." This alternate story, one that they describe as
the tortured and depressing story of the way in which the state, in exchange for welfare payments, has claimed and exercised rights to meddle
with the family lives-even the sex lives-of poor mothers and other
women, in ways that would be legally and social intolerable with regard to
middle-class families (p. 2),
is clearly not the subject of their book.
In this Review, I aim to highlight the strengths of Professors Grossman
and Friedman's rich and insightful approach, to the study of family law
while also calling attention to the ways in which their focus on the middleclass family may distort our understanding of the relationship between the
family, law, and society. I begin in Part I by discussing the aspects of the
book that track what legal casebooks and treatises traditionally classify as
"family law"-the law of marriage, divorce, child custody, and adoption. I
discuss the book's expansive treatment of the law of public assistanceincluding Social Security and Medicare-and argue that by focusing on the
impact that broad social developments can have on the law, the authors are
able to make observations about the development of law in areas that have
been defined by legal academics as doctrinally distinct, yet share a common
genesis in social change. In Part II, I identify the area where the authors
could have further expanded this approach: the treatment of families that do
not fit the book's marital, middle-class lens. Part III argues that the exclusion of poor families from the book's scope calls into question some of its
causal historical claims.
I.

THE LAW "INSIDE" THE CASTLE

To begin, what is the law of the family? And what is "family law"?
These two questions, I would argue, have very different answers. The first
invites us to consider the many ways in which families are created, shaped,
and constrained by law. The "law" at issue may be law that we think of as
tax law (marriage benefits and penalties, child care credits), property law
(the ownership of property acquired during a marriage, including land, income, and pensions), public assistance law (including the law of public
entitlements based on family relationships, such as Social Security, Aid to
Families with Dependent Children, and its successor, Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families), zoning law (including restrictions on individuals living
together who do not qualify as a "family"), trusts and estates law (including
intestate succession and the effect of family status on inheritance taxes), tort
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law (including interspousal tort immunities), contract law (including what
spouses may or may not promise one another), insurance law (including the
provision of health insurance through employer and family relationships
rather than through government subsidy), and criminal law (including the
rapidly developing law of domestic violence).
Family law, in contrast, is indisputably the law of marriage and divorce
and the law of parent-child relations. Open almost any casebook with the
title "Family Law" or "Domestic Relations" and you'll see it-cases covering topics such as entry into marriage, the intact marriage (maybe including
some of what we might otherwise call "property law"), and the law of divorce, including child custody, child support, spousal maintenance, and
property distribution. Many casebooks also give attention to parent-child
relations, including adoption law and the law of relatively new alternative
reproductive techniques, such as in vitro fertilization and surrogacy. Different casebooks, of course, emphasize different issues. At least one casebook
has made an effort to destabilize the importance of marriage, beginning instead with adoption. 6 Others include more extensive treatment of the
property interests of spouses in ongoing marriages and the public assistance
aspects of family relationships. 7 But the ghost that haunts all of these casebooks is the content of the domestic relations portion of the bar exam-the
nuts and bolts of marriage and divorce. Casebook authors who deviate from
the standard format do so consciously, with the knowledge that what they
are doing is unexpected and divergent.
The distinction I am drawing here is not new. The last few years have
produced a flowering of scholarship challenging the traditional constraints
of the doctrinal field of family law. Janet Halley has written several articles
tracing the genealogy of "family law" and critiquing what she calls "family
law exceptionalism"-the treatment of the family and the market as separate
spheres, and the consequences that follow in the law school curriculum.8 Jill
Hasday has critiqued scholars' unthinking fidelity to what she calls the
"canon of family law"-a canon that excludes welfare law and federal regulation of the family from its ambit, even as these areas of family regulation
grow at an astounding pace. 9 Indeed, the thrust of much of family law scholarship today is the intersection of what has traditionally been considered
"family law" and the fields excluded from Hasday's canon-including criminal, tax, immigration, Social Security, and pension law--demonstrating that
6.
7.

See JAMES DWYER, FAMILY LAW (2012).
See, e.g., LESLIE JOAN HARRIS ET AL., FAMILY LAW (4th ed. 2010).
8. Janet Halley, What Is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part 1, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1
(2011); Janet Halley, What Is Family Law?: A Genealogy PartII, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 189
(2011); Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, CriticalDirections in Comparative Family Law: Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism, 58 AM J. CoMP. L. 753
(2010).
9. Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. Rav. 825 (2004); see
also Jill Elaine Hasday, ParenthoodDivided: A Legal History of the Bifurcated Law of Parental Relations, 90 GEO. L.J. 299 (2002) (exploring the history of the divide between one set of
legal norms for dealing with poor families and another for wealthier families).
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these other areas shape, benefit, and constrain families just as much as the
law of marriage and divorce.' 0
Inside the Castle's strengths and weaknesses become visible when
viewed through this lens. We can begin with its title, which suggests through
the "castle" metaphor a kind of "family law exceptionalism." When someone says "a man's home is his castle," the phrase invokes notions of privacy,

autonomy, and perhaps wealth. The castle metaphor suggests that this book
is fundamentally a history of the private family, not the publicly regulated
one.
To a great extent, the book tracks the story told in traditional family law

casebooks. The subjects that Grossman and Friedman cover in detail do
little to destabilize the notion that the traditional married couple is at the
center of family law and other "nontraditional" families are at the periphery.

Thus, we have chapters on the role of marriage in society (Chapter Two),
common-law marriage (Chapter Three), and the demise of heart-balm stat-

utes (breach of promise to marry, seduction, alienation of affections, and
criminal conversation) (Chapter Four). Nonmarital relationships and samesex relationships are presented as exceptional, as consequences of changes

in sexual mores (Chapters Five, Six, and Seven). Divorce gets its own chapter (Chapter Eight), as do the economic consequences of divorce (Chapter
Nine) and the children of divorce (Chapter Ten). Parentage comes next
(Chapters Twelve and Thirteen), and adoption is the caboose (Chapter Fourteen)-just as it is in most family law casebooks."1
It's not just the structure of the book that is traditional but the choice of
materials as well. Most of the famous cases taught in family law classes are
here-Griswold v. Connecticut 2 and Eisenstadt v. Baird,13 Loving v. Virgin6
ia 4 and Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,5 McGuire v. McGuire

10. See, e.g., Sarah Abramowicz, The Legal Regulation of Gay and Lesbian Families as
Interstate Immigration Law, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 11 (2012), available at
http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/content/articles/2012/04/Abramowicz_65 VandLRevEnBancl 1.pdf (immigration); Kristin A. Collins, Administering Marriage:Marriage-Based
Entitlements, Bureaucracy,and the Legal Construction of the Family, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1085
(2009) (pensions); Goodwin Liu, Social Security and the Treatment of Marriage: Spousal
Benefits, Earnings Sharing, and the Challenge of Reform, 1999 Wis. L. REV. 1 (social security); Shari Motro, Preglimony, 63 STAN. L. REV. 647 (2011) (tax); Melissa Murray, Marriage
as Punishment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2012) (criminal law).
See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW (3d ed. 2012);
7; CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F. BRINIG, AN INVITATION
TO FAMILY LAW (3d ed. 2006).
11.

HARRIS ET AL., supra note

12. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing a constitutionally protected interest in privacy
that covers the use of contraceptive devices by married couples).
13. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (establishing the right of unmarried couples to possess contraception).
14. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (establishing the right to marry a person of a different race).
15. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (establishing the right of same-sex couples to marry).
16. 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953) (holding that a wife cannot sue her husband for support
without also leaving the marriage).
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17
and Williams v. North Carolina,
and of course the famous "palimony" case
8
Marvin v. Marvin. The book tells a story that most family law instructors
probably already know, but gives additional context, texture, and fascinating
details about the cases that will be useful for teachers of family law who
want to augment their students' (and their own) understanding of the cases
they are exploring. Did you know, for example, that when the sheriff who
arrested Richard and Mildred Loving for violating Virginia's antimiscegenation law was interviewed about his actions, he said, "The Lord made robins
and sparrows, not to mix with one another"? (p. 35). Or that after Michelle
Triola lost in the damages phase of her "palimony" case against actor Lee
Marvin, she nevertheless entered into another nonmarital relationship, living
with Dick Van Dyke for thirty years until her death? (p. 132). Or that one of
the reasons for the expansion of California's domestic partnership law was
the inability of the surviving same-sex partner of a flight attendant killed
during the September 11, 2001 attacks to inherit his partner's estate? (p.
240). Inside the Castle is studded with such gems and will be of great use to
teachers of traditional family law courses.
Inside the Castle is at its best, though, when it deviates from the familylaw-casebook script. Both authors have published nuanced historical work
on specific aspects of the law of the family, and the book is particularly rich
when they draw on this prior work. Professor Grossman, for example, has
coauthored a pair of excellent articles on the history, respectively, of adoption and annulment at the turn of the twentieth century. 19 The adoption
article shows, by examining a set of cases from one county, that the passage
of adoption statutes facilitated new legal family forms that tracked the social
realities of many families; grandmothers, for example, became able to formally adopt their grandchildren.2" The annulment article asks why, given the
increasing availability of divorce, people still sought annulments and finds
that the main reason was that divorce was simply not available to those who
sought annulments-they were either bigamists seeking to officially terminate their second, void marriage or the "parents of impetuous teenagers
seeking to erase" their children's "marital mistakes."'" And Professor
Friedman has written paradigm-shifting articles on the history of no-fault
divorce, in which he demonstrates that no-fault divorce did not fall from the

17. 317 U.S. 287 (1942) (holding that every state has a rightful and legitimate concern
in the marital status of persons domiciled in the state sufficient to grant a divorce, even when
the other spouse is not present).
18. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976) (holding that contracts between unmarried cohabitants for
domestic services are enforceable).
19. Joanna Grossman & Chris Guthrie, The Road Less Taken: Annulment at the Turn of
the Century, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 307 (1996); Chris Guthrie & Joanna L. Grossman, Adoption in the ProgressiveEra: Preserving, Creating,and Re-CreatingFamilies,43 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 235 (1999).
20. Guthrie & Grossman, supra note 19, at 253.
21. Grossman & Guthrie, supra note 19, at 330.

April 20131

Family History

1007

sky, but instead followed a long, unofficial move toward22no-fault through
collusive divorce, a process he termed "creeping no-fault.
These insights turn up again in Inside the Castle, and in some ways turn
on its head the conventional wisdom regarding how law and society interact.
Instead of blindly accepting that new laws gave people a roadmap for how
to behave, Professors Grossman and Friedman show that law exists, at least
in part, because people want it to. If people want adoption, annulments, or
no-fault divorce, eventually they'll get them. This is what the authors seem
to mean by "law of the family." They look beyond the law on the books to
law in action and carefully show how the changing desires of people in the
aggregate-what we might call "social change"-slowly move the law and
force it to change to suit society's needs.
Perhaps the freshest and most significant contribution of Inside the
Castle is its explication of the changing dynamics between generations in
middle-class families. Professors Grossman and Friedman devote a chapter
to discussing the ways in which social changes in family structure have affected the law relating to the intergenerational family (Chapter Eleven).
Here, they are unfettered by doctrinal distinctions, deftly blending what legal scholars would label "trusts and estates," "Social Security," and "health
law" into a compelling story of the adult child's liberation from the duty to
care for aging parents. 23 Indeed, they expressly acknowledge that they are
straddling a doctrinal divide, explaining that separating "family law" from
the law of succession "ignores one of the important social roles of the fanily" (p. 236).
Consistent with their "law as mirror of society" thesis, Professors
Grossman and Friedman tie changes in the law of old age to the social
changes preceding them. Significant changes occurred in the twentieth century that affected the way families operated intergenerationally. First,
America became a firmly industrial society, rather than an agricultural one,
making the extended family a less reliable economic resource than it previously had been (pp. 253-54). Second, the Great Depression exacerbated the
changes wrought by the Industrial Revolution, leaving adult children much
less likely to be in a position to support their aging parents. 24 Third, as the
century wore on, old people began to live longer lives, ostensibly benefiting
from medical advances, but as Professors Grossman and Friedman put it,
living "perhaps too long" and finding themselves "in the twilight of their
lives, unable to take care of themselves and their property" (p. 252).
What legal devices stepped in to fill this gap? Social Security, Medicare,
and a new apparatus of guardianships that included more ward-protective

22. Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead Language: Divorce Law and Practice Before
No-Fault, 86 VA. L. REv. 1497, 1523-25 (2000); see also Lawrence M. Friedman, Rights of
Passage:Divorce Law in HistoricalPerspective, 63 OR. L. REV.649, 659, 664 (1984) [hereinafter Friedman, Rights of Passage] (exploring the historical evolution of divorce law toward
modem-day no-fault divorce).
23.
24.

Seechapter 11.
See pp. 253-54.
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features than the guardianships of the nineteenth century. Inside the Castle
does a marvelous job of showing that while on the surface federal programs
such as Social Security and Medicare seem intended to benefit the elderly,
"the benefits also flow to their children and grandchildren" (p. 254). They
then tie the existence of these federal benefits to a seemingly unrelated area
of law-state statutes criminalizing or providing civil penalties for the nonsupport of aged parents by adult children (pp. 252-53). These statutes, they
show, have decreased in number, and even in those states that still have them
on the books, "[t]here is little evidence that any of these statutes are actually
enforced, except sporadically" (pp. 252-53). As the social obligation to support one's aging parents has diminished for social and scientific reasons, the
legal obligation has diminished as well. 25 And new legal devices, such as
federal assistance programs, have arisen to ensure that someone cares for
aging parents (pp. 253-54). The cost of their care has simply been spread
across the public at large (pp. 253-54).
Inside the Castle also makes some astute observations about changes in
the law of guardianship. Guardianships, the authors argue, used to give
guardians extraordinary power over their wards (p. 259). But as the population has aged and life spans have lengthened, the law has stepped in to
protect aging wards by limiting the rights of guardians (pp. 257-59). "The
general principle," Professors Grossman and Friedman conclude, "is to give
the guardian only so much power as is absolutely necessary; and let the
ward continue to live and do, as much as he can" (p. 259). They
acknowledge that, despite this trend, there are undoubtedly widespread
abuses of the elderly and suggest that this area of law will be one to watch in
the coming years (pp. 259-60). "A dollar spent on caregivers, nursing
homes, and medical care is a dollar that will not pass to the heirs," they
point out (p. 260). The tension between the expectation that children deserve
their inheritance and the reality that some elderly people will spend yearsor even decades-in assisted living has, they suggest, led to new legal
2' 6
schemes that "safeguard[] the rights.., of old but vulnerable people.

II.

THE LAW "OUTSIDE" THE CASTLE

Inside the Castle pushes the boundaries of family law in one
direction-toward recognizing the importance of legal regulation of the intergenerational family-but it refuses to push the boundaries in other
directions. Most noticeably, it assumes that the family in question is middle
class and married or the modem equivalent-a cohabiting couple who
"acts" married. It's here where I wish the authors had been bolder, more
willing to take on the vast swaths of late-twentieth-century law that affect
working-class and poor families. Granted, a book can only be so long, and
Inside the Castle is rich and impressive without tackling the law "outside"
the castle. I wonder, however, whether taking into account the law of the
25.
26.

See pp. 253-54 ("As the family ties got weaker, the state stepped in.").
See pp. 260-61.
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poor family would have affected the book's understanding of the relationship between law and society.
Early in their book, Professors Grossman and Friedman characterize
nineteenth-century law as respecting and supporting a family that conformed to a traditional stereotype of the middle-class family:
Here is the cozy home; in it, a man and a woman, married and faithful to
each other, sit at the head and foot of the table; he is the breadwinner, and the
head of the family, ruggedly masculine, in charge, ruler of the roost, but a
benign despot, firm but understanding, an object of respect and not of dread.
She, on the other hand, inhabits a "separate sphere." She is the homemaker,
the soft and delicate core of the family, neat and feminine, the loyal and
trustworthy wife, obedient and helpful, darning the socks and baking the
bread; the primary caregiver of the children; a warm and tender presence,
who teaches the children religion and ethical values, who instructs them to
honor their father, and blankets them with the unique blessing of mother
love. And the children too-the apple-cheeked boy and girl-are enveloped
in sweetness and affection, as they grow up in the image of their parents.
And, of course, the family is middle class and white. (pp. 3-4)
Professors Grossman and Friedman are surely correct, as Stephanie Coontz
has taught us, in stating that this ideal family was "always something of a
myth."27 But it's a myth that the authors sometimes seem to believe, as they
tell the story of the ideal family's social and legal reshaping into the modern
"expressive marriage" of today (p. 58). Inside the Castle is the story of the
social forces that have chipped away at the contours of the idealized, nineteenth-century family. The rugged, individualist breadwinner goes to work
in an office and becomes less communitarian and more individualistic; the
feminine, nurturing housewife does the same. Pretty soon, gender roles have
blurred, both spouses are seeking more than just economic interdependence,
and a lack of "spice" or "zing" in the marriage is enough to provoke divorce.
Our middle-class, white couple must now experience twentieth-century
divorce court, along with the division of property, a child support order, and
the pain of a child custody determination that has no clearly predictable outcome. Or perhaps the couple decides to cohabit rather than marry; then the
law must decide how to treat this family when the decision to marry was
never made but the actions of the couple appear to indicate a marriage-like
relationship. Or perhaps the couple has difficulty conceiving; we now encounter the law of adoption and the law of alternative reproductive
technologies, such as intrauterine insemination and in vitro fertilization.
Maybe our couple is no longer a man and a woman at all-perhaps it is two
gay men who seek to marry and enlist an egg donor and a gestational surrogate in their quest for children. Regardless of the tweaks to the hypothetical,
at its core, the family imagined in Inside the Castle is still some version of
the middle-class, nineteenth-century ideal with a twentieth- or twenty-firstcentury twist. To a certain extent, Professors Grossman and Friedman's
27.

P. 4; see STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES
8-14 (2000).

AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP
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book actually reifies the centrality of the mythical middle-class family by
focusing on some aspects of "law of the family" but not others.
One need not stray far from the "canon of family law" to imagine a very
different paradigm at the core of twentieth-century family law. Consider, for
example, the famous Supreme Court case Moore v. City of East Cleveland.28

Inez Moore was an impoverished sixty-three-year-old African American
grandmother who owned a home in East Cleveland, a largely white town
that was slowly becoming increasingly black.2 9 Moore had at least three
sons, one daughter, and twenty-two grandchildren, many of whom lived in
her home from time to time. 30 At the time of the litigation that resulted in the
Supreme Court's ruling, Moore was living with one of her sons, his son (her
grandson), and another of her grandsons, who was the child of another one
of her sons, and whose mother had died.3 1 The case erupted as a result of a
zoning law that "was written to avoid slums ....to avoid violence ....to

avoid all the problems that the inner cities [were] experiencing throughout
the country."32 The zoning law limited the occupants of single-family homes
to "not more than one dependent married or unmarried child of the nominal
head of the household or of the spouse of the nominal head of the household
and the spouse and dependent children of such dependent child.

' 33

In Inez

Moore's case, this meant that although she could live with one of her adult
sons and that son's son, she could not simultaneously live with the sons or
daughters of her other adult children-indeed, to do so was a crime for
34
which she was arrested.
The case was a close one, with Justice Powell reportedly casting his initial vote for the City and changing his mind only after reading Justice
Brennan's draft dissent.3 The constitutional right to privacy, the Court held
in an opinion authored by Justice Powell, included the right to live with
family members outside the nuclear family.36 The zoning law in question

37
failed to respect family privacy by "slicing deeply into the family itself."
Where is Inez Moore in Inside the Castle? She makes one inconspicuous
appearance in the chapter on cohabitation (pp. 127-28). The authors use
Moore as a foil for cases evaluating whether unmarried cohabitants can legally live together. The suggestion-I think-is that despite the ubiquity of
unmarried cohabitation, the law has not caught up with social practice
because it sometimes zones these families out of neighborhoods

28. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
29. Peggy Cooper Davis, Moore v. East Cleveland: Constructing the Suburban Family,
in FAMILY LAW STORIES 77, 77-80 (Carol Sanger ed., 2008).
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 77-78.
Id.
Id. at 89 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
For a more complete narrative of Moore, see id. at 77-93.

35.
36.

Id. at 90.
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977).

37.

Id. at498.
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(pp. 127-28). In contrast, Moore represents-in the story told by Inside the
Castle-the traditional family, protected by the Constitution (p. 128).
Moore is a fascinating case, one that could productively spark an examination of many facets of the modem "law of the family." For example,
Moore is an excellent example of how the state disproportionately intrudes
into the family lives of the poor and highlights how this intrusion can be
racially charged. It shows how laws that do not fall within the traditional
ambit of "family law," such as the zoning law at issue in Moore, can nevertheless be used as a regulation of family life. It also shows that regulation of
the "deviant" family can take extremely punitive forms, criminalizing a family's decision to do something as simple as living together. But in Inside the
Castle, Moore instead becomes a stand-in for the "traditional" family
against which cohabitating adults are judged and found wanting.
This unusual reading of Moore appears to be the result of the authors'
decision to exclude the law affecting poor families from the book almost
entirely. As Professors Grossman and Friedman candidly explain, this is not
a book about poor families, which are not traditionally covered in the field
of family law (p. 2). The other "vast field, which deals with poor families,"
they explain, "is a significant factor in American law, and has a huge literature of its own" (p. 2). Hence, "[w]e will refer to this alternate system of
family law from time to time, but we do not deal with it in much detail" (p.
2). The decision to largely omit poor families from the book has important
effects on the narrative Professors Grossman and Friedman tell. It enables
them to focus effectively, in a book covering a sweeping time period and a
variety of legal doctrines, on the coherent theme of increasing autonomy and
individualism. But it also has the result of masking how the law affects
many Americans, perhaps even most. Here, I'll suggest just a few ways in
which I think this editorial decision skews the story.
First, the story that Inside the Castle tells about marriage is the story of
shifting priorities. There was a real shift, the authors argue, "in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries-for middle-class families in
particular-from traditional to companionate marriage" (p. 57). And
"[t]here have been two big marriage stories in the twentieth century," they
explain: "the decline of anti-miscegenation laws and the emergence of gay
marriage" (p. 142).
With regard to middle-class families, I think that Inside the Castle gets it
right. It seems indisputable that there was a major shift from marriage as a
gendered, hierarchical, and economic relationship to "expressive marriage"
in which "[h]usband and wife were looking for personal fulfillment; they
evaluated their marriage 'in terms of self-development, as opposed to the
satisfaction they gained through pleasing their spouse and raising their children.' "38 This development explains the increasing acceptance of interracial
and same-sex marriages. If marriage is not the building block of social and
38. P. 58. Here, the authors cite ANDREW J. CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE-Go-ROUND 88
(2009), which extensively documents the shift from traditional marriage to expressive marriage.
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economic life, but rather a private relationship that fosters happiness in individual people, then society has no interest in restricting it.
But surely the biggest "marriage story in the twentieth century" is neither of these stories, but instead the decreasing importance of marriage
itself. In 1960, 72 percent of the adult population was married, and the
median age at which a woman married was 20.3.39 In 2010, just fifty years
later, barely half of the adult population was married, and the median age of
The changes were substantially larger
first marriage for women was 26.5.40
4
for poor women and black women. '
Instead of the story of shifting marital goals told by Professors Grossman and Friedman, the story of the twentieth-century family could be the
displacement of the married couple with children from its privileged central
seat in family law's legal universe. Marriage, of course, is still one of the
key operating principles in family law, but it has had to make way for alternative family structures. June Carbone, for example, has argued that family
law fundamentally changed during the latter half of the twentieth century
from regulating the married couple to regulating the parent-child relationship. 42 Professor Carbone argues that two forces led to this change: "the
dismantling of marriage as the exclusive determinant of family connections"
and "the revitalization of the law of custody,43child support, and community
obligation addressing parental relationships.
A story about the displacement of marriage as the core of family law
and a new emphasis on the parent-child relationship would help us understand the importance of litigants like Inez Moore. For Moore and her family,
"expressive marriage" was likely beside the point. The relationship at issue,
the network of "kin care" of which Moore was the hub, was focused on giving children the care that they needed, not on the spiritual and social
enrichment of individualistic husbands and wives. As Peggy Cooper Davis
44
has noted, the kin care network has a long tradition in the United States.
The Supreme Court's willingness to recognize the importance of kin care in
Moore may have been the first sign of a change in legal attitudes toward

39.

D'VERA COHN ET AL., PEw RES. CENTER, BARELY HALF OF U.S. ADULTS ARE

MARRIED-A RECORD Low 1, 9 (2011), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/201 1/
12/14/barely-half-of-u-s-adults-are-married-a-record-low/.
40. Id. at 1.
41. RALPH RICHARD BANKS, Is MARRIAGE FOR WHITE PEOPLE? 7 (2011) (noting that
black women are only half as likely as white women to be married and three times as likely
never to marry); NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES v. BLUE FAMILIES 118-19,
121, 124 (2010) (discussing declining marriage rates among poor women).
42.

JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS 227 (2000).

43. Id.
44. Davis, supra note 29, at 78 (discussing the tradition of family networking that
"supported immigration to and adjustment in the United States[] [and] sustained workingclass families in times of hardship" and tracing this tradition to as far back as early families
living in slavery who supported "friends and extended family members.., and saw collectively to the needs of all their children").
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nonmarital families, reflecting an understanding that marriage is not the only socially acceptable family form.
Inside the Castle does gesture at the decreasing importance of marriage,
but it does so in a way that keeps what Martha Fineman calls "the sexual
family" at the forefront of the discussion, rather than adult-child caretaking
relationships.4 5 Many couples that would have married generations ago, the
authors suggest, now cohabit instead (pp. 125-27). Thus, cases about sexual
rights-the repudiation of antisodomy laws in Lawrence v. Texas,46 for example, as well as cases about the right to use sex toys, the tort of seduction,
and criminal adultery laws-get ample airtime. Cohabitation itself gets a
whole chapter, and a very interesting one at that, in which the authors show
how indeterminate the current law of cohabitation is as it tries to respond to
rapidly changing social norms and expectations surrounding nonmarital relationships (Chapter Six). But even the chapter on cohabitation seems to
miss the reality of many people's lives. "Few modem-day couples have
faced a sheriff's pounding on their door in the middle of the night
demanding to see a marriage license," the authors explain (referring to the
harrowing experiences of couples such as Henry Thomas and Mary Long,
convicted in 1897 of lewd cohabitation, and Richard and Mildred Loving,
forced to leave Virginia in the 1960s for violating the state's ban on interracial marriage). 47 But of course, many twentieth-century couples did

experience caseworkers snooping around to determine whether they were
having sex-thus committing "welfare fraud" by disguising the presence of
a man who, in the eyes of the law, should have been providing for his sexual
partner, regardless of his marital status. 48 Welfare law imposed a marital
obligation on people who were emphatically not married; it used the force
of the law to limit the sexual freedom and family privacy of poor womenhardly an example of increasing sexual freedom.
Sometimes, the relentless focus on the marital, middle-class family takes
Inside the Castle into murky waters, turning causal relationships on their
head. For example, the rise of child support guidelines and the unprecedented amount of federal, rather than state, involvement in child support are
described primarily as a function of no-fault divorce (pp. 224-26). At first,
45.

See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMI-

LY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 143-76 (1995) ("I use the term 'sexual' to
modify 'family' to emphasize that our societal and legal images and expectations of family are
tenaciously organized around a sexual affiliation between a man and woman.").
46. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
47. Pp. 121-23 (citing Thomas v. State, 22 So. 725 (Fla. 1897)); p. 35 (citing Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
48. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 313-14 (1968) (striking down an Alabama regulation that made a woman ineligible for welfare if she had a sexual relationship with a man);
Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 425 P.2d 223, 233-34 (Cal. 1967) (determining, in the course
of considering a wrongful termination claim brought by a welfare caseworker, that California's practice of conducting mass early-morning raids on welfare recipients' homes in order to
ferret out fraud violated their constitutional rights); see also Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 698 n.242 (noting that the raids were
intended to find men who might be cohabiting with female welfare recipients).
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this simply appears to be a convenient organizational decision; there is a
chapter on "the children of divorce" and there are two important
determinations regarding children that courts must make in a divorce proceeding-child custody and child support (Chapter Ten). Since the authors
made the decision at the outset to focus on traditional "family law" rather
than "welfare law," there's no other obvious place to put this discussion. But
placing it in a chapter on divorce implies that most children who receive
child support get it because their parents have divorced. In fact, Inside the
Castle goes further than just placing the discussion under the heading of
"divorce"; it makes divorce the cause of federal involvement in child support (pp. 224-26). Congress took an interest in child support guidelines, it
argues, because divorce pushed women and children into welfare: "Many
divorced moms and children depended on welfare, sometimes because fathers were not paying" (p. 225). Likewise, Inside the Castle describes
Congress's interest in enforcement-getting "deadbeat dads" to pay-as a
problem of divorce: "Many fathers simply did not pay; this left many children of divorce in poverty" (p. 225).
But, of course, child support isn't just about divorce. In fact, much of the
modem law of child support stems from an entirely different social and scientific development-paternity testing. This focus is evident from the
structure of the law itself, as the authors of Inside the Castle acknowledge in
passing: "IT]he first step toward getting a child support award" is establishing paternity (p. 228)-not usually difficult in the case of a divorcing couple
but quite complicated when the parents are unmarried and the mother has
had multiple sexual partners or does not want the father of her child in her
life. In fact, the field of child support is a particularly fascinating piece of
the history of family law because of the unprecedentedly coercive actions
taken by Congress in the face of marital decline. Throughout the 1980s and
1990s, Congress passed statutes intended to force mothers to identify the
fathers of their children or forgo welfare, and to force states to set up systems to facilitate paternal identification. 9 The history of these statutes is
telling, both as a case study in the sudden federalization of what had traditionally been a matter of state control and because of how states have
responded to the federal demand to identify "fathers" by passing a variety of
statutes, some privileging biology and others function.5" Inside the Castle
refers to some of these schemes (pp. 292-96), but it does so by focusing on
the constitutional rights of fathers as set forth by canonical Supreme Court
cases, 51 not by acknowledging the complex relationship between federal
legislation and state practice and the proliferation of theories of paternity.
49. Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, Child Support Enforcement, and Fatherless Children, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 325, 346-50 (2005).
50. See id. at 365-69 (discussing Maryland's approach); see also Naomi Cahn & June
Carbone, Marriage,Parentage,and Child Support, 45 FAM. L.Q. 219, 234 (2011) (discussing
various forms of identifying nonmarital parents, including "functional" doctrines such as "de

facto parents").
51.

P. 292 (discussing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), and other cases analyz-

ing paternal identification statutes).
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The emphasis on the middle-class, marital family, then, obscures the existence-and the substantial legal regulation-of families that did not fit this
norm. It also obscures another important feature of twentieth-century family
law: the great variety in the extent to which the state treated families as
"public" (and therefore ripe for regulation) or "private" (and thus untouchable). Early in the book, Professors Grossman and Friedman state that
"[tihere are no legal rules about how to raise children" (p. 17). True, the
homemaking wife "who teaches the children religion and ethical values,
who instructs them to honor their father, and blankets them with the unique
blessing of mother love" is not scrutinized by actors with legal power (pp.
3-4).
But of course this is not true for all families. The zoning law at issue in
Moore was surely a "legal rule about how to raise children"-a rule flatly
stating that two grandchildren with different parents could not be raised together by their grandmother. 52 And zoning wasn't Inez Moore's only
problem. The East Cleveland Deputy Housing Inspector visited her home
frequently to record housing code violations such as a leaky sink, a
defective light, and walls that needed plastering.53 These housing code
requirements may only incidentally regulate the raising of children, but they
are rules nevertheless.
Poor families know much better than wealthy families how easy it is to
allow a home to slide into disrepair when a work schedule is demanding and
resources are scarce. Children can be removed from families due to abuse or
neglect, even where the "neglect" at issue is in fact largely the result of poverty.54 Families that receive state assistance experience even more scrutiny
of their parenting; those that receive assistance, for example, have to submit
to frequent home visits in which social workers judge their parenting and, if
it is found wanting, may institute proceedings to remove their children from
the home.5 And this heightened scrutiny for poor families appears to hit
black families with particular force.5 6 Dorothy Roberts, in her masterful
study of the child welfare system, found that children in foster care in major
urban centers-children who actually have been removed from their
homes-are disproportionately black, and shockingly so.5 7 Focusing on poor
families helps us to see that there actually are legal rules about how to raise
children, but the rules only lead to a cognizable complaint against parents in
circumstances where the state has reason to pierce the veil of family privacy
52.
53.

Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 496 n.2 (1977).
Davis, supra note 29, at 88.

54. Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 637,
666-67 (2006) (noting that approximately 50 percent of child welfare cases involve "povertyrelated neglect," including substance abuse, inadequate housing, or inappropriate child care

arrangements).
55. See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 326 (1971) (upholding New York's home
visitation requirement against a Fourth Amendment challenge).
56. DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 9 (2002).
57. Id. (reporting that 95 percent of foster care children in Chicago are black, and only
3 percent of foster care children in New York are white).
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and intervene. Poverty is both the cause of state intervention and, all too
often, the reason a family is found lacking. This level of state intervention,
as Professors Grossman and Friedman briefly acknowledge, "would be legally and socially intolerable with regard to middle-class families" (p. 2).
III.

STORMING THE CASTLE: THE LAW

"OUTSIDE" MOVES IN

So far, I've argued that Inside the Castle helpfully expands traditional
notions of what counts as "family law" in the direction of intergenerational
families but hews to unnecessarily narrow doctrinal limitations in its treatment of poor families. I want to spend the last part of this Review
considering whether the doctrinal scope of the book matters in judging its
causal, historical claims. Or, to use the metaphor suggested by the book's
title, can we understand what's going on "inside the castle" without considering what's happening outside as well?
The historical approach Professors Grossman and Friedman use is consistent with the historical methodology that Professor Friedman has
developed throughout his career. Professor Friedman is well known as the
originator of the "mirror" thesis, a rejection of the idea that law is autonomous and an embrace of society as the agent of change.58 Or, as he and
Professor Grossman put it in Inside the Castle, "the dependent variable ...
is the law that affected the family. Changes in family life itself act as the
independent variable-the motor cause" (p. 7). Professor Friedman's methodological shift has been an extraordinarily important contribution to legal
history, quite rightly questioning the autonomy of the law and showing how
it works in tandem with social change.59 But his work has also been widely
critiqued for taking this move too far and underestimating the importance of
the law in particular contexts. 60 I think it's worth thinking here about how
the strengths and weaknesses of Professor Friedman's "law as mirror of society" approach play out in the context of the history of the law of the
family.

58. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 12 (1973) (stating in
prologue that "this book is a social history of American law"); id. ("This book treats American
law, then, not as a kingdom unto itself, not as a set of rules and concepts, not as the province
of lawyers alone, but as a mirror of society."). For an analysis of Friedman's "mirror" thesis in
the development of legal history methodology, see Christopher Tomlins, Framing the Field of
Law's DisciplinaryEncounters: A HistoricalNarrative, 34 LAW & Soc'y REV. 911, 959-60
(2000).
59. FRIEDMAN, supra note 58, at 12.
60. See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, Perspectives on the Development of American Law: A
Critical Review of Friedman's "A History of American Law", 1977 Wis. L. REV. 81, 81, 8384 (arguing that "Professor Friedman's perspective leads to serious distortions when particular
problems are examined"); G. Edward White, Book Review, 59 VA. L. REV. 1130, 1134-35,
1140 (1973) (reviewing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1973))

(criticizing Friedman's work for placing too little emphasis on constitutional law and jurisprudence).
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For many features of the modem law of the family, the approach taken
by Inside the Castle has a tremendously compelling explanatory value. The
speed with which same-sex couples have obtained marriage rights in a
number of states, for example, has come as a surprise to many in the
field 6 -- even those who strongly support such rights. Legal change just
doesn't usually happen that quickly, or so we tend to think. But according to
Professors Grossman and Friedman, same-sex marriage is just the tip of a
larger iceberg. Marriage itself changed substantially in the twentieth
century. A definition of marriage that focuses on rigid gender hierarchy and
economic roles would be hostile to same-sex couples, but a definition that
focuses instead on self-expression and mutuality has little problem accommodating them. Although the authors refuse to speculate on the future of
same-sex marriage (p. 155), their argument suggests that its acceptance is
inevitable. Just as no-fault divorce finally came into official, legal being after years of "creeping decay" (p. 172), we might expect to see a similar
dynamic with regard to expanding the categories of who may marry. Rather
than looking to the existence of same-sex marriage statutes, we might instead want to look at the underenforcement of sodomy statutes to
understand and predict how same-sex couples will ultimately be treated.
Judges looked the other way when they saw collusive divorces in fault-based
jurisdictions. 62 And, as noted in the discussion of elder law above, laws requiring adult children to support their aging parents are rarely enforced
today.63 A theme underlying much of Inside the Castle is not just that law
follows society but also that society sometimes underenforces law if the
politics of the day prevent law from officially catching up to society.
But sometimes Inside the Castle goes too far in its emphasis on society
over law. Professors Grossman and Friedman are undoubtedly right that
much of twentieth-century family law resulted from social change and the
needs and desires of the middle-class family.' 4 But by excising poor families
from their book, they are able to ignore the way in which the law channeled,
regulated, and even coerced poor families into conformity. In other words,
I'm not sure a "history of the middle-class family" makes sense as an analytical category. Too much of family law is influenced by the areas of law
that challenge the boundaries of the traditional family-law casebook. And
even when it is initially poor families that are regulated by the law, the law
has a way of coming back to haunt the middle class, redefining what is possible and creating a feedback loop that regulates the regulators. The families
that still live "inside the castle"-and they are fewer and fewer in numbermay find that their "castle" is remarkably leaky.
Throughout the book, we are told that the law developed because "society" wanted it that way. For example, we have no-fault divorce today because
See p. 153 (noting the "somewhat surprising cascade" of state legislatures adopting
61.
laws that permit same-sex marriage).
62. Friedman, Rights of Passage,supra note 22, at 662.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
64.

See p. 7.
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people want it.65 Easy access to divorce, Professors Grossman and Friedman
tell us, is not the cause of the family's erosion, but the effect: "A happy marriage does not end because divorce is available at bargain-basement prices"
(p. 180).
But what about those areas of the law where the "we" asking for the
regulation differs from the "they" who are regulated? If law is a "mirror of
society," what are we to make of welfare reform that demands that mothers
of small children work (thus demonstrating "personal responsibility") even
when no adequate childcare is available to them? What are we to make of
welfare law's family caps? Of state welfare laws that require mothers to
demonstrate that their children are maintaining a minimum GPA? 66 Who is
the "society" demanding this law, the "we" at work?
The answer has to be something like "those who are not on welfare."
But the devil is in the details. How does the middle class define itself over
and against the poor? How does it become a unified whole, capable of imposing its normative view of family onto others? And why is the normative
view of family that the middle class applies to itself (autonomous, flexible,
privately chosen) so different from the one it would apply to the poor (monitored, regulated, publicly controlled)? Inside the Castle provides no answers
to these questions.
If the idea of the "we" of "society" is underdeveloped in Inside the Castle, so is the idea of what law is and what law can do. In fact, the answer to
the questions I outlined above may simply be "law." Law itself may provide
the ideology that further supports the imposition of its values, with little
self-reflection, on the poor by the middle class. The division, for example,
of public benefits into "earned" ones, such as Social Security (even though
the majority of women collecting it do so not because they paid into it but
because they are or were married), and "charity" or "welfare," may in turn
influence how individual people understand what the government owes
them.67 We can make distinctions between the autonomous, private middleclass family and the monitored, controlled poor family in part because the
structure of law shapes an ideology of difference.
Had Inside the Castle paid more attention to the poor, I think it would
have had to paint the "law of the family" as less benign, less a function of
what "society" really wants, and more punitive, controlling, andpossibly-pernicious. But the poor aren't the only ones affected by this
broader understanding of the law of the family. Law intended to regulate the
poor can function as repressive and regulatory, even for the middle-class
society that, in theory, created it. For example, Inside the Castle gives short
65. See pp. 13-16, 176-80.
66. For a summary of the family restrictions that welfare law places on recipients, see
Tonya L. Brito, The Welfarization of Family Law, 48 U. KAN. L. REv. 229, 246-47, 256-68

(2000).
67. For a discussion of Social Security as "contract" and welfare as "charity," see Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, Contract Versus Charity: Why Is There No Social Citizenship in
the UnitedStates?, in THE CITIZENSHIP DEBATES 113, 124-27 (Gershon Shafir ed., 1998).
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shrift to the massive federalization of law affecting the family in the twentieth century.68 We are left with the impression that the twentieth century left
us as autonomous individuals, free to lead self-directed lives. But more attention to federalization might have revealed an interesting feedback loop
that goes something like this: "Society" demands federal intervention into
69
the family, whether through federal child-support enforcement statutes,
the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA"), 70 the Family and Medical
Leave Act ("FMLA"), 71 or federal law mandating state-level sex offender
registries. 72 In turn, these federal laws put pressure on the states to comply-and often in ways that are counterproductive and likely contrary to
what "society" wanted in the first place. The constraints placed on noncustodial parents whose children receive welfare expand to cover all
noncustodial parents, rich or poor.7 3 VAWA and the state-domestic-violence
statutes it spawned can lead to "de facto" divorces where neither party wants
separation. 74 The FMLA provides leave to family members but also creates
new norms that may discourage more generous employer policies, and by its
own terms effectively excludes many low-wage workers. 7 Adult individuals
are "freer" to engage in consensual sex or cohabit, but the "sex offender"
has grown in the public imagination, taking the place of the "homosexual"
or "deviant" as the dangerous, vilified other whose presence must76be tracked
and controlled, even if such regulation may be counterproductive.
Or, to return to the example of same-sex marriage, "social change" may
account for why same-sex couples want recognition of relationships that
used to be considered immoral, but "law" may explain the form that such
recognition takes. Marriage has bundled into it extensive benefits that in
some societies are instead thought of as social welfare rights, accessible to
all regardless of marital status. 77 Without the law of marriage, it is difficult
to say whether there would be social demand for something called "marriage" in the United States, but the European experience indicates that the
68. See, e.g., pp. 40-50 (describing in detail how state marital laws developed and
changed throughout the twentieth century, and only mentioning that national marriage law
would have resolved interstate conflicts).

69. See 42 U.S.C. § 667 (mandating that all states use child support guidelines).
70. See Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 16, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
71. See Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2006).
72. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248,
120 Stat. 587 (codified in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.).
73. Brito, supra note 66.
74.

See

JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVO-

LUTION Is TRANSFORMING PRIVACY 41-50, 126 n.7 (2009).

75. Robin R. Runge, Redefining Leave from Work, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y
445,447-49 (2012).
76. See J.J. Prescott, Do Sex Offender Registries Make Us Less Safe?, REGULATION,
Summer 2012, at 48, 53-55.
77. For a discussion of the differences between the United States and other countries in
the allocation of public benefits, see Fraser & Gordon, supra note 67.

1020

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. I111:1001

decoupling of welfare rights from marriage is strongly correlated with lower
marriage rates. 78 Even those in a position to demand that the law follow their
social desires are constrained by law.
If we consider the public, federal, and regulatory side of the marriage
coin in tandem with its private, local, and facilitative sides, we see not only
that society shapes law but that law creates a feedback loop that further reconstructs society. Or, as Nancy Cott so aptly puts it (describing marriage,
no less): "Law and society stand in a circular relation: social demands put
pressure on legal practices, while at the same time the law's public authority
frames what people can envision for themselves and can conceivably de'
79
m and.
CONCLUSION

Inside the Castle is a remarkable achievement. It is the first attempt by
legal scholars to pack all the turbulence of the twentieth-century family into
one text. On many levels, it succeeds magnificently. As an adjunct to family
law courses, it will be indispensable. And it makes important contributions
to our knowledge of how the middle-class family understands itself today
and how these understandings are reflected in law.
Indeed, I would highly recommend it as bedside reading for anyone who
teaches family law, especially those who are about to do so for the first time.
I also imagine that Inside the Castle will frequently be excerpted in casebooks on family law and other subjects because it so neatly condenses vast
amounts of material into a relatively short space. In their individual work,
both Professors Grossman and Friedman are marvelous writers, and Inside
the Castle reflects their considerable talents-the prose is breezy and lively,
propelling the reader forward.
There is still room, however, for a legal history of the family that considers a wider range of families and how "the law of the family"-in all its
forms-affects families of all stripes. Families, as Professors Grossman and
Friedman recognize, no longer live in castles, if they ever did (p. 21). The
castle as a metaphor for the home creates a vision of the family that is
crumbling today. But what may make the family truly different today is not
that there is no castle but that there is no inside. Sex, the raising of children,
the work of household production-all of these activities have become regulated by law, both state and federal, in ways that would not have been
imaginable 100 years ago. For poor families, this new reality is exceptionally true. But even the middle-class family-the ideal that was "always
something of a myth" (p. 4)-is far less private and autonomous, and far
more susceptible to the disciplinary force of the law, than Inside the Castle
suggests.
78. See, e.g., Andrew Cherlin, American Marriage in the Twenty-First Century, 15 J. OF
MARRIAGE & CHILD WELL-BEING 33, 46, 50 (2005) (discussing differences in legal importance of marriage in the United States and Europe, and the United States' higher rates of
marital instability and multiple partners over time).
79.

COTT, supra note 1, at 8.

